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Psychosocial research 
 
Stephanie Taylor 
The Open University, UK 
 
Introduction 
The most notable feature of psychosocial research is its exploration of problems in terms of the 
interconnections between subjectivities and societies, in contrast to more conventional research 
approaches which might separate ‘personal’ and ‘social’ or ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ as distinct categories 
and levels of analysis. Some of the best-known psychosocial research has therefore been 
transdisciplinary, bringing the foci of psychology and psychotherapies to topics like class and climate 
change which have more usually been studied by academics from, respectively, sociology and 
geography rather than psychology. However, the relation of psychosocial studies to the psychology 
discipline remains complex. Many psychosocial concerns are those of social psychology, including 
self, subjectivity and identity, relationships and intimacy, and emotions, sometimes linked to the 
newer concept of ‘affect’. In addition, there has been substantial input from psychologists into the 
development of psychosocial studies, through the work of both historic figures (William James, 
Sigmund Freud, Melanie Klein) and contemporary social and critical psychologists, including Stephen 
Frosh, Wendy Hollway, Paul Stenner, Valerie Walkerdine and Margaret Wetherell. Yet many 
psychosocial academics have come from other disciplines, such as sociology and geography, and one 
sociologist suggests, in a rather caricatured criticism, that a major attraction for many students and 
researchers is that psychosocial research addresses conventional psychological concerns, such as 
‘minds’, ‘feelings’, ‘people’, without ‘the besetting positivism and scientism of much academic 
psychology’ (Rustin, 2014, p.198).  
 
The first section of this chapter outlines how psychosocial studies developed in part as a 
response to claimed deficiencies in the tradition of psychology which includes social constructionist 
and discursive psychology. The following section looks at a definition of psychosocial studies and 
sets out three key concepts which are common to the variety of theoretical and research-based 
writing presented as psychosocial. These are: the concept of an interface or ‘inbetweenness’, 
implicit even in the term psychosocial; the concept of the ‘extra-rational’ as aspects of problems and 
situations which psychosocial researchers attempt to capture, and the concept of ‘affect’ which has 
varied meanings but relates in some references to the extra-rational. The following section discusses 
several published studies as examples of the application of psychosocial research to real life 
1 
 
problems, with a special focus on the different methods which have been used. The final sections of 
the chapter review current trends in psychosocial research and discuss its future relationship to the 
psychology discipline. 
 
Critique of mainstream social psychology mainstream theory and research 
The formation of psychosocial studies as a distinctive area of research has followed in large part 
from critiques of the psychology tradition which includes social constructionism (e.g. Gergen 1985), 
discourse analysis (Potter and Wetherell 1987; Wetherell and Potter 1992) and discursive psychology 
(Edwards 1996; Edwards and Potter 1992). This tradition, developed mainly in the 1980s, established 
within social psychology some of the premises associated with poststructuralism more generally. 
These include the rejection of predictive theories which model relationships and causality in terms of 
discrete factors, and also the rejection of the notion of a universal essentialist individual who may be 
to some extent socialised to adapt to a particular society but remains bounded and agentic. In 
addition, the discursive tradition introduced analytic techniques involving the close examination of 
language data. The development of the tradition has been associated with an attempt to shift 
psychology away from ‘an old positivist paradigm’ (Parker, 2012, p.472). However, this ‘turn to 
language’ inevitably came to be seen as introducing new problems. 
 
Many of the critiques of the discursive tradition follow from its supposed concern with 
language as a purely linguistic entity, that is, with words as separate from their contexts and 
whatever they refer to and, relatedly, with language use as rational and intellectual, concerned only 
with logical arguments and connections. Discursive approaches have therefore been criticised for 
what they exclude, including the material world, embodiment (Blackman et al, 2008), experience, 
personal investment (discussed below), and ‘desires, anxieties, and needs’ (Woodward 2015, p.62). 
Although these critiques rest heavily on an interpretation of both language and discourse which can 
itself be challenged as overly narrow (Taylor 2015), they contributed to the development of 
psychosocial studies. For example, Paul Stenner (2014a), proposing a psychosocial approach which 
‘attends to experience as it unfolds in and informs those networks and regimes of social interactivity 
(practice and communication) that constitute concrete historical and cultural settings’ (p.205), refers 
to subjectivity as ‘an aspect of experience that cannot be reduced to discursive practices, even if 
those practices structure it and pattern it’ (p.206, emphasis added). 
 
This points to a further set of critiques, regarding discursive conceptualisations of 
subjectivity and the subject. In the discursive psychological tradition, the subject is assumed to be 
2 
 
socially constituted, positioned within multiple (and unequal) relations. Because these relations and 
the situatedness are fluid, the subject is fragmented and unfinalised in its identifications and sense 
of self, shaped by ongoing activities and interactions. Discursive psychologists therefore challenge 
theories of a universal subject, insisting on the inescapability of relationality and context, including 
the aspects of society which are commonly discussed as cultural, economic and historical. Discursive 
psychologists also challenge cognitive psychological models of the person as a bounded individual, 
criticising assumptions of internal mechanisms and functions. For example, part of the discursive 
psychological argument is that a discussion of conventional psychological phenomena such as 
remembering or emotion should confine its reference to observable actions within discourse, 
treating these as situated and oriented to the immediate interaction, rather than as the expression 
of the underlying mental processes (e.g. Edwards 1997) of a unitary ‘container’ subject. 
 
This conceptualisation of a discursive subject is obviously inconsistent with most everyday or 
commonsense notions of the person. In addition, the notion that a person is no more than a loose 
aggregate of the different relations and positions given by multiple social relationships and activities, 
has been criticised by many academics. Yes, someone may be a mother and a teacher and a Green 
Party voter, middle class, Hindu by family religion, and so on, but doesn’t she also have a distinctive 
personal identity which is separate to these (and other) categorisations and more than all of them 
combined together? Questions of this kind and attempts to understand ‘subjectivity as more than a 
subsidiary effect, as more than the sum total of combined discursive positions’ (Blackman et al, 
2008, p.7) have contributed to the development of psychosocial studies in the UK. 
 
One important starting point for an alternative theory of the subject was the collection 
Changing the Subject: Psychology, Social Regulation and Subjectivity (Henriques et al, 1984/1998), 
originally published in 1984. In this collection, Wendy Hollway argued that the multiple available 
identities or discursive positions are not all of equivalent importance (Hollway 1984/1988). As in her 
later work with Tony Jefferson, Hollway drew on Object Relations Theory to propose that an 
attachment to one particular discursive or subject position can be understood in psychoanalytic 
terms as an ‘identity investment’ (Hollway and Jefferson, 2000, p.19). This investment is the 
outcome of a ‘unique biography of anxiety-provoking life-events and the manner in which they have 
been unconsciously defended against’ (p.24). Hollway and Jefferson’s work therefore employs 
concepts from psychoanalysis and associated psychodynamic theories in order to address the 
problem of ‘the disappearance of the (totally decentered) subject’ (Hoggett, 2014, p.192) in the 
discursive tradition, and in doing so reclaims the continuity and interiority of the subject which 
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discursive theories had previously challenged. This is not the only version of a psychosocial subject 
but it remains central to psychosocial studies. 
 
The narrative of critique which I have presented in this section is inevitably over-tidy and 
linear because the discursive tradition did not replace or even substantially disrupt existing (social) 
psychology approaches. It is now one of several paradigms, including so-called ‘positivist’ research, 
which co-exist uncomfortably within the psychology discipline. In this context, psychosocial research 
is sometimes invoked to present similar critiques of mainstream psychology to those previously 
offered by the discursive tradition (although usually in less caricatured terms than those of Rustin, 
quoted in the introduction to the chapter). For example, Christopher Groves et al (2015) present a 
‘psychosocial framework’ to challenge the assumption that people are ‘rational choosers of 
behaviours’, criticising factor models in social psychology which centre on this concept. In another 
example, Rosalind Gill (2012), discussing ‘the sexualisation of culture’, argues against a trend of 
psychology-based US research which quantifies ‘sexualised’ media material and assumes a uni-
directional influence or causality of ‘harm flowing in one direction from the media to the individual’ 
(p. 488). Gill contrasts this with research in media and cultural studies which, she suggests, is also 
problematic because it tends to overstate the ‘active, knowledge, sophisticated and critical’ nature 
of audiences and media consumers (p. 489). For Gill, psychosocial research can avoid these 
extremes; she therefore calls for  
‘psychosocial approaches that are capable of thinking about the complicated, entangled 
relationships between visual culture, desire and subjectivity, and rethinking media ‘effects’ 
not as discrete, measurable events, but as part of ongoing processes of the disciplining and 
reconstructing of selfhood – in which we are all implicated’ (p.494).  
These examples suggest that psychosocial research has to some extent taken over a critical position 
in relation to the psychology discipline as a whole, including both the discursive tradition and more 
mainstream areas. 
 
Presentation of critical alternatives 
The previous section offered a brief account of the development of psychosocial research as a 
critique of (some approaches in) social psychology, including discursive psychology. This section 
explores the distinguishing features of psychosocial studies, although the extent to which this 
coheres as a single field distinct from psychology is debatable. A useful starting point for discussion 
is provided by the following definition, developed for a recent book series: 
‘Psychosocial Studies seeks to investigate the ways in which psychic and social processes 
4 
 
demand to be understood as always implicated in each other, as mutually constitutive, 
coproduced, or abstracted levels of a single dialectical process. … Psychosocial Studies is also 
distinguished by its emphasis on affect, the irrational and unconscious processes, often, but 
not necessarily, understood psychoanalytically’ (cited in Frosh, 2014, p. 161). 
 
The definition indicates the continuing importance for psychosocial studies of the concepts 
and theories from psychoanalysis which were introduced through the work of Hollway, Jefferson and 
others. The definition is open, suggesting that psychosocial research is ‘often, but not necessarily, 
understood psychoanalytically’ (emphases added), a point which has generated considerable 
debate. For example, Paul Stenner (2014a) has called for ‘an open definition of psycho-social studies 
as a critical and nonfoundational transdiscipline’ without ‘the premature consolidation of a version… 
foundationed upon psychoanalysis’ (p. 205). More specifically, Stenner rejects the psychoanalytic 
assumption of a separation between an ‘inner world’ and an ‘outer world’ (terms which are 
associated with ‘British School psychoanalysis’, Frosh, 2014, p.163), arguing that both are 
abstractions which derive from modernity. Other writers, including myself, have argued that it is not 
necessary to adopt the language of psychoanalysis to do the work of ‘psychosocial’, proposing 
instead that developments within the discursive tradition within psychology can similarly merge 
conventionally separate levels and entities to explore the mutual constitution of subject and social 
context (Wetherell 2003; McAvoy 2015; Scully 2015; Taylor 2015). However, for many academics the 
psychoanalytic is an essential feature of the psychosocial. For example, Woodward suggests that the 
term itself refers to ‘the connections, and …the spaces between the social and the psychic’ 
(Woodward 2015, p.2: emphasis added).  
 
The definition also indicates some key concepts for psychosocial studies. The first follows 
from the point that ‘psychosocial’ does not refer to two separate or separable components i.e. 
‘psychological’ and ‘social’ or ‘psychic’ and ‘social’. Rather, psychosocial studies theorise and 
research how these are ‘always implicated in each other’. Various terms and theorisations have been 
offered for the new site or unity produced by such ‘connections or interfaces between the person 
and the larger realm of the social, variously defined’ (Taylor, 2015, p.9). The above definition refers 
to ‘a single dialectical process’ whereas Gill mentions ‘ongoing processes’ (plural) as well as 
‘complicated, entangled relationships’. Some writers have adopted an alternative spelling of the 
term ‘psychosocial’ as ‘psycho-social’, with a hyphen, in order to signal ‘overlap and penetration’ as 
another version of this mutual implicatedness (Hoggett 2014, p.192).  The sociologist Kath 
Woodward using the language of psychoanalysis, opens the interface into a ‘third space’ that is 
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‘somewhere between the psyche and the social but that nonetheless involves both’ (p.88). 
Somewhat differently, Stenner (2014b) suggests that ‘betweenness’ can be conceived using the 
concept of liminality which ‘points to the importance of thresholds of transition, or zones of 
becoming’.  It can be argued that a similar conception of mutual implicatedness already existed in 
social psychology, including in discursive psychology (Taylor 2015). Nevertheless, the concept an 
interface or betweenness is a key one for psychosocial studies and its project of connecting social 
and political issues with subjectivities.  
 
A second key concept is indicated by the reference, in the definition for the book series 
quoted above, to ‘the irrational’. This term is of course taken from psychoanalytic theories. 
However, psychosocial research which draws on other traditions also attempts to go beyond the 
rational in its analyses, as in the attempts outlined above to take account of more than language, 
and also in Gill’s suggestion, quoted in the previous section, that psychosocial research can go 
beyond what is ‘discrete’ and ‘measurable’, including to accommodate ‘desire’. In this chapter, I 
therefore adopt the broader term of the extra-rational for this second key concept of psychosocial 
studies. This overlaps in its reference with a third key concept ‘affect’, although that term has a 
wider reference. 
 
As part of its exploration of subjectivities and the extra-rational, psychosocial research often 
utilises the term ‘affect’ (in one but not all of its meanings) to refer to feelings and emotion, 
especially when reinterpreted as a social or collective phenomenon which operates between and 
across people rather than within individuals.  For example, Steve Pile, reviewing influential writing 
on affect from the geography discipline, suggests that affect is defined in contrast to ‘cognition, 
reflexivity, consciousness and humanness’ (p.8), using ‘cognition’ in the sense of what is ‘thought’ or 
thinkable. Simon Clarke (2006), drawing closely on Hollway and Jefferson, suggests that the study of 
many ‘societal phenomena’, such as ‘racism, sexism, inequality and social exclusion’, requires an 
acknowledgement that  
‘we are not just rational social creatures but live in a world of social relations that are 
tempered by feelings and emotive dynamics that are often not obvious, or to use 
psychoanalytic language, motivation in action is often unconscious ‘ (p. 1161).  
Clarke’s work is therefore an example of psychosocial research which elides the irrational or extra-
rational, the emotional and the unconscious.  
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An additional connotation of the term affect, following from the collective reference noted 
above, is that it can be used to refer to the transmission of feelings in some manner which is, again, 
extra-rational and even ‘uncanny’. In this further elaboration, affect, unlike emotion, does not 
originate within the individual body but is assumed to be an unbounded and transpersonal flow, 
moving between bodies. The contribution of this rather difficult conceptualisation can be shown 
through a relatively early example from the work of the cultural theorist, Sarah Ahmed (2004). 
Ahmed is interested in how emotions move or flow between people, and also how they become 
temporarily attached to different objects or signs; she cites the example of fear becoming attached 
to an asylum seeker or a burglar. She suggests that  
‘the sideways movement between objects, which works to stick objects together as signs of 
threat, is shaped by multiple histories. The movement between signs does not have its origin 
in the psyche, but is a trace of how histories remain alive in the present’ (p.126).  
 
This is therefore an attempt to understand powerful feelings like fear and hate as social 
phenomena, beginning not with an individual psyche, as in a psychoanalytic account, but a 
sociohistoric context in which, by implication, the affects already exist and circulate, with the 
potential to become attached to new objects. To understand where they become attached, or how 
they ‘stick’ different words together, like ‘terrorist’ and ‘Islam’, it is necessary to investigate ‘past 
histories of association’ (p.127). Ahmed refers to an ‘affective economy’ but an alternative metaphor 
for her account might be a weather system in which global movements and changes produce local 
conditions of wind, temperature and rainfall. Her work indicates the potential implications of this 
conceptualisation of ‘affect’ as different to ‘emotion’, although in work of many writers on the 
psychosocial the terms are still used almost synonymously. 
 
Somewhat differently, Margaret Wetherell (2012) uses the term ‘affect’ while retaining the 
focus on the emotions and the extra-rational (although not inevitably irrational) but rejecting a 
psychoanalytic or psychodynamic account. Instead, developing  Ian Burkitt’s argument (2014) that 
emotion must always be understood in relational terms, Wetherell proposes the concept of 
‘affective practice’ which, she suggests, incorporates notions of ‘ongoingness’ and ‘patterns in 
process’ (p.23). The concept builds on the discursive psychological and ethnomethodological notions 
of ongoing practice as interactional and constitutive of the contexts and order of social life. 
Wetherell discusses affect as situated activity based on acquired practices, both social and personal: 
‘affective practice is based on a semiotic hinterland organised by personal biography’ (p.153) and 
the ways that past practice results in an accumulation of ‘affective habits and associations’ (p.155) 
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which are ‘carried forward into new relational fields’ (p.155). For Wetherell, transmission can also be 
understood in terms of interactions and relational practices. She criticises accounts of the spread of 
affect as irrational, for example in the behaviour of protesting crowds. She suggests that in such 
accounts an us/them distinction may operate:  
‘We conclude that the affect of those we disagree with spreads by contagion, we decide that 
our own affect, on the other hand, when we protest, is simply caused by events and is a 
justifiable reaction’ (p.148). 
 
Yet another conception of affect is that associated with ‘process’ psychology (Brown and 
Stenner 2009)i. An example is offered by Brown and Tucker (2012) who argue that the term 
‘provides a way of engaging with “experience” shorn of some of its humanist garb’ (p.232) while also 
capturing some of its non-rational aspects. This position is presented in part as another critique of 
discursive psychology which Brown and Tucker regard as static, erasing ‘flow and transformation’ 
(p.234). They suggest that the account which they offer recaptures a ‘dynamism’ absent in discursive 
psychology (although, as with some previous critiques, their claims about discursive psychology can 
be disputed e.g. Taylor 2015). Brown and Tucker develop their account of affect from the work of 
Henri Bergson, adopting his notion of experience as doubly partial. Perception is ‘a dynamic, 
adaptive process’, selective and inevitably incomplete, which ‘carves out’ aspects of ‘a mobile, ever 
changing reality’ that can never be wholly captured (p.235). A paraphrase of their account might be 
that experience is a glimpse, from a limited viewpoint, of a fast-moving ever-changing scene, like the 
view from a dirty train window! From Brian Massumi, Brown and Tucker take the further points that 
this perception is a form of potential engagement with reality, shaped by the ‘current needs 
…situated concerns’ and ‘ability to act’ of the perceiver (p.236) and producing, out of these 
relationships, the perceiver’s sense of her/himself as an individual. 
 
Brown and Tucker’s work is an example of a different psychosocial approach, in a Deleuzean 
tradition (see also Motzkau 2009). Their account draws attention to experience as inevitably situated 
and shifting, linked to unstated (and unstateable) possibilities, so involving more than can be pinned 
down in rational accounts, and also as non-generalizable, since the possibilities or potentialities will 
be given by the particularities of both the immediate situation and the experiencing body. The 
difficulty, as they acknowledge, is to import concepts from philosophy into the social sciences, 
including social psychology. Brown and Tucker conclude that ‘intermediary concepts’ are needed to 
move from the general concerns of philosophy to the specificities of research in order to engage 
with participants’ accounts of their situated experience and to illuminate potentialities. 
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 Perhaps the most distinctive feature of this form of psychosocial research is its orientation 
to futures and possibilities. This contrasts with the ‘thick description’ of what is or was which has 
characterised most research in the qualitative tradition, including in social and discursive 
psychology. The difficulty, of course, is to ground a forward analysis into the future, including 
potentials and possibilities, so that it is not reduced to free speculation . This is not a novel problem 
but Brown and Tucker’s work suggests that a new challenge for psychosocial researchers is to 
address it by developing an empirical approach to the formulation of more grounded claims of this 
kind. The next section of the chapter outlines some examples of psychosocial research into ‘real life’ 
situations, including one article which attempts to address the issue of forward analysis set out by 
Brown and Tucker. 
 
Applied psychosocial research  
The previous sections have outlined the development of psychosocial research and introduced three 
concepts which characterise it: an interface or site of betweenness which links the problems of 
subjectivities and societies investigated by psychosocial researchers; the extra-rational as an aspect 
(or aspects) of these problems, and affect as one version of the extra-rational. This section will 
present some examples of psychosocial research into ‘real life’ situations to illustrate the variety of 
problems, forms of data and analytic approaches associated with the field.  
 
An early and influential example of research described as ‘psychosocial’ was a project of 
Helen Lucey, June Melody and Valerie Walkerdine ‘Transitions to Womenhood’, which investigated 
the difficulties faced by girls growing up in the UK. The research was presented in their highly 
influential book Growing Up Girl (Walkerdine et al, 2001) and also in a 2003 article which I discuss 
here (Lucey et al, 2003). One of the aims of this research was to investigate social class by going 
beyond ‘rational’ accounts to investigate ‘conscious and unconscious psychological processes … not 
only in the research process but in the very constitution of contemporary gendered and classed 
subjectivities’ (p. 279).  (There is an obvious similarity here to Clarke’s account, above.) This aim 
followed from the researchers’ conceptualisation of a subject as ‘not entirely rational’ but defended 
(as in Hollway and Jefferson’s work, also discussed above). A further premise was that ‘class’ is not a 
straightforwardly objective category, for instance, as defined economically, but rather, a 
sociocultural position involving ‘identifications, ‘dis-identifications ….disavowals and desires’. 
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The researchers on ‘Transitions to Womenhood’ conducted a longitudinal interview study 
and analysed their data in a three part procedure. The first part, common to most qualitative 
research projects, involved taking the interview data at ‘face value’, for example, as evidence of the 
events of participants’ lives. The second part involved looking at ‘words, images and metaphors’, as 
in a discursive analysis of language data, but the main purpose here was to look for evidence of 
‘unconscious processes’. To do this, the researchers looked at the talk itself, for instance, 
‘Inconsistencies and contradictions, beginnings, fade-outs, connections, absences and silences’, and 
also considered their own responses to the interview encounter, recorded in their fieldnotes. These 
included points in the interview when the researcher had felt bored or irritated or anxious; in 
psychoanalysis, these feelings can be evidence of unconscious communications or transferences. In a 
third stage of analysis, the researchers worked together to uncover further unconscious 
communications which may not have been recognised by the researcher herself in her role as the 
interviewer, talking to the families. Relevant evidence here could be a response or interjection from 
the researcher which changed the direction of the talk.  
 
The example discussed in the article (Lucey et al 2003) comes from a family’s discussion of 
whether their daughter would eventually move away from her parents’ home. Part of the analytic 
interpretation was that the researcher’s contributions created tension in the interview situation and 
also followed from her own experiences of leaving home. The detail of the encounter was 
interpreted as evidence for a more general claim based on the whole data-set, that it has been far 
less common and acceptable for working class than middle class young women to move some 
distance from their families, for example, to go to university or advance their careers. The analysis 
therefore included an interpretation of the extra-rational, specifically the unexpressed and 
unrecognised anxieties around girls leaving home and, more broadly, the meanings of home and 
stability for working class people, at a time in the UK when there was a major political policy of 
selling council houses, creating pressure for former tenants to move on as part of a trajectory of 
upward mobility. As this account of the article indicates, the research exemplifies many of the 
features of psychosocial research noted in the previous sections, including the use of psychoanalytic 
theory in an account of the extra-rational as part of an investigation of subjectivities and 
contemporary social problems. 
 
A more recent example of psychosocial gender and family research is presented by Ann 
Phoenix and Bruna Seu (2015). This article discusses the effects of serial migration, a common 
phenomenon in non-affluent countries which results in members of the same family having to live 
10 
 
apart for long periods. The research the article presents investigates daughter-mother relationships 
in which the mothers migrated to the UK in the 1950s and 60s, leaving their daughters with other 
family members in the Caribbean, in most cases for a number of years. Drawing on a dataset of 
interviews with 39 women and 14 men who were child serial migrants, the article focuses on 
interviews with four of the women, analysing their stories of their childhoods, including their 
reunions with their mothers. According to the authors,  
‘The women’s experiences of serial migration were psychosocial in that they were produced 
in particular sociocultural contexts and were central to their subjectivities as well as to their 
daughtering’ (p.312).  
 
The analytic approach which is adopted in this article combines narrative analysis (which is 
not defined in detail as a separate approach) with ‘a psychoanalytically informed reading that is 
sensitive to the conflictual and dilemmatic nature of the psychodynamics involved in the reunion’ 
(p.304). This is similar to the first and second stage of Lucey et al’s analysis, except that Phoenix and 
Seu do not attempt to analyse the relationship with the researcher/interviewer or her responses. 
The analysis refers to Object Relations Theory and argues that  
‘A psychoanalytically informed reading of the women’s narratives enabled a ‘thicker’, 
dynamic understanding of the women’s stories and captured the complex and conflictual 
nature of the reunion with their mothers’ (p. 313).  
 
This analysis uses as evidence both the participants' (reported) feelings and actions in 
situations which they describe, and the ways in which their accounts are structured, for example, 
with gaps, or juxtaposing references to past and present time. As one instance of this, the authors 
note that  
‘The timelessness and switching back and forwards in the narrative hints at the multilayered, 
deeply disorienting nature of the reunion as not just being traumatic itself, but reactivating 
the old trauma of the separation’, p. 307) 
Phoenix and Seu’s article therefore conforms to the general description of psychosocial research 
offered in this chapter, investigating a larger social phenomenon (the effects of serial migration on 
family relationships) through an analysis of subjectivities and attachments. The analysis refers 
(briefly) to affect. It refers to the extra-rational in psychoanalytic terms (e.g. ‘unconscious’, 
‘repressed’) although the analytic approach differs from that of Lucey et al (2003). 
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A third study is presented in an article by Mark Finn and Karen Henwood (2009), published 
in a social psychology journal. This research investigated contemporary fatherhood through a 
longitudinal interview study with 30 UK first-time fathers, with additional data from focus groups. 
The researchers analyse the men’s accounts to investigate their ‘identificatory imaginings’ (p.549) of 
fatherhood. These are understood to be shaped by both social meanings, including discourses of 
hegemonic masculinity and new fatherhood, and personal meanings, following from participants’ 
aspirations and biographical trajectories. This is therefore another version of interface or 
betweenness, played out in the talk of the participants. Subjectivity and the social are here 
conceptualised in discursive terms. The authors discuss at some length their interpretation of 
psychosocial research, suggesting it involves  
‘a concern for what holds discourse and interiority/externality in place at the level of the 
subject, and what it means to be a person with a particular version of self and the world 
while not reproducing social/individual dualism or individualistic discourse’ (p. 550).  
 
This article is therefore relatively unusual in that it defines the psychosocial with reference 
to discursive, and narrative, but not psychoanalytic concepts (although see also McAvoy 2015; Scully 
2015; Taylor 2015). Referring to critiques of Hollway and Jefferson’s work and related approaches, 
Finn and Henwood specifically reject the use of psychoanalytic theorising, stating  
‘we want to maintain a concern for internal life that is not separate from the social world 
and discursive repertoires that shape it, but nor do we want to essentialize this interiority in 
psychoanalytic and truth-testifying terms’ (p. 550).  
 
The fourth example of psychosocial research to be discussed in this section addresses a 
problem more usually associated with geography or environmental studies than psychology. The 
research project, Energy Biographies, was conducted by an interdisciplinary group of researchers, 
including psychologists, to investigate socio-environmental sustainability by looking at people’s 
energy-use practices and their decisions (not) to adopt more sustainable practices, like cycling. In a 
2015 article, Christopher Groves, Karen Henwood, Fiona Shirani, Catherine Butler, Karen Parkhill and 
Nick Pidgeon propose that life practices must be understood in their social settings and in relation to 
biographical experiences. The analysis presented in the article focuses on ‘transformative moments’ 
(Groves et al, 2015, p.9) in the formation of attachments to particular practices. The authors argue 
that these moments are linked to emotional meanings or investments and to valued identities. Like 
Phoenix and Seu, Groves et al refer to Object Relations Theory but without attempting the analysis 
of transference utilised by Lucey et al. The psychosocial approach of Groves et al uses interview 
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material as evidence of people’s practices, memories, experiences and feelings, treating it as reliable 
reportage without exploring the narrative or discursive features referred to by Phoenix and Seu. This 
article presents its approach as a challenge to the use of multi-factor modules to explain decision-
making and behaviours, challenging ‘models of social change that assume individuals can be treated 
as rational choosers of behaviours’. In this respect, it can be seen to challenge mainstream social 
psychology. An additional notable feature of the study is that, although working in a different 
theoretical tradition to Brown and Tucker, it engages with the problem they considered, that is, a 
future-oriented analysis which produces findings concerning possibility of change. In this case, the 
concern is for changes to more environmentally sustainable practices. Groves et al recognise how 
attachments to current practices are linked to identity. They argue, however, that individual and 
shared patterns of attachment do not inevitably produce resistance to change but, equally, can 
‘encourage participation in more sustainable practices, as part of an identity’ (p.25). They therefore 
suggest that the analytic framework they present ‘opens up the possibility of connecting practice-
theoretical approaches to psychosocial work relating to lifecourse transitions’ (p.26). 
 
Current trends in psychosocial research 
The relationship between (social) psychology and the field of psychosocial studies or psychosocial 
research remains complex. Psychosocial research utilises concepts and whole areas of theory which 
are strongly associated with psychology, while rejecting most of the discipline’s established 
approaches, sometimes in caricatured terms. In this respect, psychosocial studies might appear to be 
the successor to the tradition of social constructionism, discourse analysis and discursive psychology, 
or even the latest ‘turn’ in that tradition, taking up a critical and innovative position in relation to 
mainstream psychology.  An important difference is that so many psychosocial academics locate 
themselves outside psychology, either defining psychosocial studies as a new discipline or retaining 
their previous association with other disciplines in the social sciences or humanities. In addition, 
their theoretical and methodological allegiances remain extremely varied (psychoanalytic, Deleuzian, 
narrative, discursive…). At the time of writing, psychosocial research continues to have a strong 
institutional presence in the UK through named departments, research groups, research projects 
and journals which are associated with a number of universities. However, there is so little 
agreement on the reference of the psychosocial (or even the spelling of the term: ‘psychosocial ‘or 
‘psycho-social’) that the field seems less likely to cohere further than to divide again, perhaps into 
social psychoanalysis, transdisciplinary psychology and the (existing and already varied field of) 
narrative. The psychosocial label could be retained as a reference for a common concern, that is, the 
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investigation of the interconnectedness of society and subjectivities, utilising methods which admit 
of some capture of the extra-rational, however conceived. 
 
 
 
Summary 
This chapter has discussed the field of psychosocial research or psychosocial studies as it relates to 
social psychology. Critiques of the conceptualisations of the social and psychological subject 
associated with the discursive tradition in social psychology led to the introduction into academic 
research of concepts and methods (such as the analysis of transference) associated with 
psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. Following these initial developments in psychosocial research, 
academics in a range of disciplines have drawn on varied theories and methodological approaches to 
explore problems of society and subjectivities, conceptualised as inextricably interconnected and not 
reducible to different ‘levels’ of explanation or interpretation, or to rational relationships of causality 
or influence. The chapter has proposed that three key concepts characterise the field of psychosocial 
studies: an interface or betweenness which is neither psychological (nor psychic) nor social; the 
extra-rational, and affect. A review of different sources was presented to illustrate these, then  
four published studies which their authors categorised as ‘psychosocial’ were discussed to show the 
range of psychosocial research and its applications to different ‘real life’ situations. A review of 
current trends acknowledged the continuing variety within psychosocial studies despite the common 
purpose and concepts identified here, and the possibility that the ‘psychosocial’ (or ‘psycho-social’) 
label will not be sufficient to contain this variety in the future. 
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i Paul Stenner notes (personal communication) that affect is often concerned with accommodating 
modes of being and reasons for action that are important but might fall short of the conventional 
definitions of rationality; arguably, affectivity has its own 'logic' or version of 'rationality', and it is 
too crass to characterise that as simply 'irrational' (as in the classic modernist split between reason 
and emotion). This is another reason for adopting the term 'extra-rational'. 
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